Must any discussion of value necessarily be moral? What I mean by that is can we discuss value without introducing ideas of good and bad, “better than”, “worse in comparison to…” OR should we go with the postmodern notion of simply saying “X is different to Y”?
In regard to the latter though, is simply claiming that “X is different to Y” just another way of expressing judgement in a different way. For example, having made the initial statement, how does one proceed? When I begin to explain how X is “different to Y”, don’t I have to use pre-postmodern terminology? Or would my doing so simply be a ‘hangover’ from traditional language use? However, what am I doing when I explain difference? Describing a range of technical aspects coupled to spaciotemporal co-ordinates? For example, Bruckner’s 7th symphony was written at time t, in space s. It has the following features, a, b and c. Now, whilst we can do this, and the result will be ‘informative’, is this kind of analysis too ‘dry’, lacking an emotional ‘edge’? A symphony is different to a pop song, but merely describing the two different forms is precisely that – a description. I’d hesitate to call it analysis. To qualify as analysis we mobilise our abilities to compare, to judge- a socio-philosophical account. We also need to include our reasons for listening to the symphony or pop song – how it affects us, what it tells us, how it communicates, the insights into the time of its production or into “the human condition”. We are, for want of a more apt term, constructing an argument – what is more, we are constructing what we hope is a persuasive argument. By so doing, whether we realise it or nor, we are aiming to produce a sense of unity, an idea that you too might enjoy this, might see these elements for yourself and recognise these as binding.
By prioritising postmodern ‘difference’, we are moved towards the concept of the individual:” the force of the artefact is lost, its value (if, in this ‘scheme’ it can be said to have value) lies in what it means to me, and only me. It is shorn of its power to unify and to comment on its ‘surroundings’.. There is no metanarrative of which it is part. Another problem here: in talking only of difference, it seems to follow that everything is as valuable as everything else…from which it follows that everything is valueless. When I make the claim that, say, X is more valuable than Y, I cannot leave the conversation there, I must continue, I must explain why. On the other hand, if I say that X is different to Y, I can abandon the conversation and move onto the next item. The idea of a conversation with others, that “runs in the background”, has disappeared.
I think we can also see a connection here with the two different ‘truths’ that have emerged over the past number of years, (a) Rational Truth (RT) and, (b), Emotional Truth (ET). When I cite RT, I’m referring to a truth that exists independently of me, a communal truth that is assessed and discussed in reference to shared ‘standards’ – of comparison, of judgement. When I cite ET, I am referring to truths that I desire to be true, that I can hold as true on the grounds of that desire and nothing else. I suppose we could also call this “individual truth” – for example, if I desire that X = A + B then it does. This kind of thinking (if, indeed, we can call it ‘thinking’) means that I can construct a world that refers only to my desires. If undesirable truths attempt to intrude on this world, I can reject these as ‘false’, even when faced with evidence to the contrary.
To give a contemporary example, if I desire to claim that everyone has equal opportunity in the world we inhabit, then I can. In fact, I can assert that your view of the world and mine are simply ‘different’ because I reject the idea of metanarrative. You might think that there is (a metanarrative) but I don’t – it’s a simple difference of opinion, and all opinions are equal.
It seems to me that, in such a (postmodern) world, any concept of ‘progress’ grinds to a halt – history stops. We have a world that consists of individuals (and the notion of self-interest that goes with this) who believe what they like…
However (and there had to be one), this non-metanarrative world is organised by, and camouflages, the metanarrative of business and profit. Put bluntly, postmodernity is an attempt by capitalism to write itself out of history while, at one and the same time, controlling it.
The end of metanarrative, and of value, then becomes the (supposed) triumph of a meta-metanarrative and a single value – the latter is no longer recognised as one value among many because, in this model, it is the only value and, therefore, becomes something else…something like “just the way things are”, ‘natural’.
In terms of ‘traditional’ political thinking, democracy becomes redundant; the state, which exists to provide services that benefit the community, ceases to exist. Rights cease to exist. We are returned to what Hobbes and Rousseau call “the state of nature” – individuals battling with one another in an unending cycle of “the survival of the fittest”.
What we see here, in political terms, is populism revealed for what it really is: fascism. There is, however, one significant difference from the fascism of the 1930s. Modern fascism does not require camps, fear and secret policemen to achieve its ends. It is replacing the repressive state apparatus by taking over the educational apparatus – hard repression is replaced by soft repression as business methods and profit are represented as universal and natural. As education becomes ‘training’, the means of protest, the ability to consider and compare, is eradicated. The multiplicity of discourses becomes one and only one.
Murmurs from the Forest 